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LET THE MAKER BEWARE
O NE of the most interesting illustrations of the effects of
economic and social developments on the course of the
common law is the trend in our court decisions toward im-
posing an absolute liability upon manufacturers of dangerous
articles-regardless of contract relations between the manu-
facturer and the person injured. Public interest has been
stirred by a number of recent occurrences and decisions.
Congress gave consideration during the month of April, 1945,
to the problem of dealing with boys' play suits composed of
materials said to be easily inflammable. 1 "The Greatest
Show on Earth" is still involved in dealing with the claims
arising out of the frightful catastrophe in Hartford, Con-
necticut, last year, which resulted from a carelessly thrown
cigarette igniting the "big top", the canvas of which had
been treated with a mixture which proved to be highly in-
flammable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just held
that a cleaning fluid, which, when uncorked, gave off deadly
gases which caused the death of a woman who was using
the fluid-even though there was a warning of the danger
on the label of the can containing the fluid-was such a
dangerous instrumentality as rendered the manufacturer
liable to the user.2
A case in which the Court of Appeals of New York
unanimously affirmed a unanimous decision of the Appellate
Division, First Department,3 holding a manufacturer liable
2 1945, CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD (H. R.) p. 3280 (April 9, 1945).
2 Maize, Adm'r v. Atlantic Refining Co. (Pa. Sup. Ct. April 9, 1945),
Legal Intelligencer, Vol. 112, No. 71, April 13. 1945. Not yet officially reported.
3 Noone v. Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 460 (1944),
aff'd, 294 N. Y. 680 (1945).
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for damages suffered by a young woman when her dress,
coming into contact with a lighted cigarette, burst into an
explosive flame the first time it was worn, was deemed of
sufficient public interest by a New York newspaper to lead
it to publish a half-column editorial comment on the shift
from "caveat ernptor" to "Let the Seller Beware". " When
such a transition calls forth popular discussion of the change
in basic legal theories, it would seem to justify a survey of
the field involved.
So far as research has revealed, this case is the first in
which a court of last resort has decided that a woman's dress
is a "dangerous instrumentality", within the general prin-
ciples of law laid down in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Com-
pany.5 The Court of Appeals in Noone v. Perlberg, by its
unanimous affirmance of the unanimous decision of the
Appellate Division reinstating a unanimous verdict which
had been set aside by the trial justice held, in substance and
effect, that it was a question for the jury whether, as expert
testimony indicated, the net overskirt of an evening gown
had been "sized" with a solution of nitro-cellulose and, if so,
whether it had become an instrumentality dangerous to life
and limb. In short, whether the fact that, the first time it
was worn, it burst into an explosive flame which seriously
injured the wearer, rendered the manufacturer of the gown
liable in damages was a question for the jury.
This particular field of the law is intriguing because it
shows a marked variation in the development of the theories
involved, over thousands of years.' It is a striking illustra-
tion of the impact of developments in the social and economic
world upon the course of judicial decisions.
In the early days of Roman civilization, the process of
buying and selling related almost exclusively to objects not
manufactured, such as farm animals and slaves, which were
bought and sold in the market-place. Where the object of
4 The New York Sun, July 15, 1944, p. 6.
5 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050; accord,
Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., Inc., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N. Y. Supp.
657 (1933) ; see Note (1927) 40 HARV. L. Rxv. 886.
6 See an exhaustive and interesting discussion in Prof. Walton H. Hamil-
ton's The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133-1187;
Prof. James A. Spruill, Jr.'s Priity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery
on Warranty (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 551-567.
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the sale was affected by a hidden defect, the question arose
as to whether the seller or the buyer should bear the loss
and, apparently, where the defect was hidden or concealed,
Roman jurisprudence gradually developed a responsibility
on the part of the seller.7 The parties involved were, of
course, only the seller and the buyer.
In the early days of the English common law, some five
hundred years ago, the sale of manufactured goods became
the subject of court consideration as to liabilities as between
buyer and seller. Bread and drink, when sold by a purveyor
-for the most part the maker-if possessing defects which
caused physical injury to the buyer, were held to render the
seller liable to the buyer who had suffered physical injury
as a result. Even where there was no evidence to support a
claim that the seller had, in substance or effect, stated to
the buyer, "I guarantee (or warrant) that this food or drink
is fit for human consumption," the courts, apparently ex-
pressing community opinion, held the maker or purveyor
liable for the injury suffered. Possibly the influence of guild
organizations had a material part in bringing about this
development. This liability was enforced on a tort basis,
in an action on the case.8
Then, over the years, the development of the individual-
istic theory of the Yankee trader, as applied to such sales,
brought about the gradual adoption of the rule embodied in
the maxim, "caveat emptor"-on the basis that, in dealings
in the market-place, the buyer was under a responsibility
to determine for himself and at his own risk whether the
article sold was what it purported to be. The courts, depart-
ivg from the early theory of an implied representation by the
seller as to the quality of the product-which they deemed
brought it within one of their tort forms of action-appar-
ently became confused by the theory that a warranty was
involved and that that had to be brought within the form
of a contract action and there seemed no satisfactory evidence
to indicate any such meeting of the minds of the seller and
7 HUNTER, RoMAN LAW (4th ed. 1903) 492-502.
8 Ames, History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53; WLLISTON,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§ 195, 196.
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the ultimate user as would justify holding the seller liable.9
Here, also, only the immediate parties to the sale were in-
volved.
A century or more ago, only a few years after the new
republic had begun to make its own law, the Empire State
developed a new theory, as volume manufacturing became
more general, that the manufacturer who endangered the life
or limb of one who purchased his product from an intermedi-
ate dealer and suffered injury as a result of the negligent
composition of a drug, which was represented to be harmless
but contained active poison, was responsible for the damage
which had been suffered by an ultimate purchaser with whom
he had no contractual relations.10
This necessitated some ingenious intellectual gymnastics
which transferred such a case from the old contract pigeon-
hole into the tort pigeonhole on a basis of misrepresentation.
The warranty, whether express or implied, which had re-
sulted in cataloguing the liability as contractual, was
changed to place it, more or less on the original basis, in
the field of negligence. Thomas v. Winchester 101 caused the
common law courts in many states to adopt a similar re-
adjustment of the theory of liability.
Even in the days of comparatively simple living, in the
eighties, when a contracting painter, whose employees were
painting a building, 'hired another contractor to build a
scaffold, and the scaffold was constructed of defective wood,
which defect caused it to break when in use by the painter's
employee, the fall resulting in his suffering severe physical
injuries, the court found a way to hold the maker liable.
Obviously, there was no contractual relationship between
the maker of the scaffold and the employee of the contract-
ing painter, who was injured by its defective structure."
The basis for this decision, as later interpreted by Judge
Cardozo, was that the contractor knew that the scaffold
would be a most dangerous trap if improperly constructed
9 Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 449 (N. Y. 1837) ; Sweet v. Colgate, 20 Johns.
196 (N. Y. 1822) ; Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines 48 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) ; Stuart
v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18 (K B. 1778).
10 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (2 Seld. 1852).
0a Ibid.
11 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, 11 Abb. N. C. 322, 42 A. R. 311 (1882).
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and also knew that workmen were to use it. This was held
to create in him a duty, regardless of contract, to build it
with care.
12
Then came the machinery age, mass production, and
numerous intervening transactions between the manufacturer
and the ultimate user of the product. Restaurants, instead
of making their coffee in coffee pots, bought great urns, for
quantity production, and these urns when in use developed
heavy pressure strains. When such a coffee urn exploded
under the strain because of a defect in its construction and
inflicted severe physical injury upon an employee of the pur-
chaser from the manufacturer, the New York court again
found that the principle originally proclaimed in Thonus v.
Winchester 12a applied, because of the inherently dangerous
qualities of the urn and the likelihood of exactly such an
accident as happened. In that case, the manufacturer had
sold the urn to a jobber who sold it to a corporation which
employed the plaintiff, and there was obviously no con-
tractual relation between the parties-yet, because of the in-
herently dangerous character, the injured person was held
entitled to recover for his injuries.13
As Judge Cardozo almost naively suggests, in discussing
this case some years later, "it may be that Devlin v. Snith
and Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. have extended the rule of Thonas
v. Winchester"! He continues, "If so, this court is committed
to the extension." Not only was the court committed to the
earlier extension, but it thereupon committed itself to an
"all-out" extension, in addition! 14
Then, too, came new customs and new inventions. Speed-
ing through the country-side, the death-dealing automobile,
composed of parts made by scores of different manufacturers
and assembled by the maker of the finished product into a
complete machine, produced a situation which obviously
caused imminent danger to life and limb-not only of the
purchaser or owner but of the guest or of the member of
the general public who was unfortunate enough to feel the
12 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 5, at 386.
12a Supra note 10.
13 Statler v. Ray, 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1063 (1909).
14 Supra note 5.
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impact of some portion of the destructive machine which,
because of some defect in manufacture, shot off from the
completed mechanism while it was in motion and caused
serious physical injury to the innocent by-stander. 15
Again, the court had to find a basis for the liability of
the original assembler of the parts, manufactured by others,
including a wheel which contained dangerous defects which
the assembler might and therefore should have discovered,
to the car owner, who was injured by its collapse. Clearly,
no contract liability could cover this case, and yet, equally
obviously, it was unfair to the general public, including
the purchaser of the completed machine, that such dan-
gerous defects could be permitted to cause injury to innocent
purchasers, guests, or by-standers without creating a liability,
and the adroit mind of Cardozo furnished the solution in the
trail-blazing opinion of the MavPherson case.
This rule has been applied in cases involving an almost
countless variety of products which -have been held to render
manufacturers liable to those ultimately injured-persons
who may never have heard of the original manufacturer.
Numerous collections of authorities in the case books 16 have
attempted rough classifications and have listed scores-nay,
hundreds-of cases including those in which foreign particles
have mysteriously intruded themselves in the process of
manufacture of bread, cake, and especially soft drinks. Law
Review articles covering different aspects of these develop-
ments would fill a bulky volume-or two! 1
15 Supra note 5.
16 See Annotations in: 142 A. L. R. 1479-1495, 140 A. L. R. 191-251, 111
A. L. R. 1239-1253, 105 A. L. R. 1502-1512, 88 A. L. R. 527-535, 86 A. L. R.
947-957, 63 A. L. R. 340-350, 42 A. L. R. 1243-1266, 41 A. L. R. 8-137,
39 A. L. R. 992-1001, 31 A. L. R. 1336-1355, 29 A. L. R. 737-817, 19 A. L. R.
1169-1361, 17 A. L. R. 672-710.
17 Hon. Chas. T. Le Viness, Caveat Emptor versus Caveat Venditor (1943)
MD. L. REv. 177-200; Hon. Win. L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Mer-
chantable Quality (1943) 27 MiNN. L. REv. 117-168; Prof. Laurence H.
Eldredge, Vendors Tort Liability (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306-334;
Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 725-748, 1225-1248;
Lindsey R. Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees (1937) 24 VA. L. REv. 134-158; Prof. Karl N. Llewellyn,
On Warranty and Society (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 699-744; Prof. Milton
Handler, False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22-51; Waite,
Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making (1936) 34 MIcH. L. REv. 494-
520; Underhay, Manufacturers' Liability, Recent Developments (1936) 14 CAN.
B. Rav. 283, 304; Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer
[ VOL. 19
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Still, in the absence of any clearly controlling authority,
one could not well be surprised that a justice at trial term
would find it difficult to declare an evening gown a "dan-
gerous instrumentality". Nevertheless, only a few years be-
fore, in a case which apparently attracted little notice, the
Court of Appeals had held by a bare majority that a child's
shoe, with a defect in the lining which caused a chafing
which broke the skin on the child's toe and started an in-
fection which killed the child, constituted an imminently
dangerous instrumentality."'
As an aside, it may be noted as an unusual feature in
the presentation of plaintiffs' cases that in this development
of the "plaintiff's law", which, in the last quarter century,
has taken the place of the "defendant's law", which had long
governed such matters, the insurance companies, usually de-
fenders, have been responsible in a number of cases for the
establishment of claims against defendants in favor of plain-
tiffs, to whose rights the insurance companies have become
subrogatedY9 Two unusual cases which have, apparently,
extended the doctrine of MacPherson against Buick Motor
Company, were prosecuted by insurance companies. In one,
the claim for damage was not for personal injuries to the
individual who suffered burns as a result of an explosion,
but a claim for the damage to a building, which was con-
sumed by a fire which resulted from the explosion. The in-
surance company, which paid the loss on the burning of a
(1933) 21 Ky. L. J. 388-406; Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding
Warranties in the Sale of Goods (1930) 25 ILL. L. REv. 400-417; Bohlen,
Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARV. L.
REv. 733-747; Prof. Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business
Risks Through Legal Devices (1924Y 24 COL. L. REv. 335, 338; Bohlen, Rebut-
table Presumptions of Law (1920) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307-321; Prof. L. W.
Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers (1920) 10 MINN. L. REv. 1, and
see also (1935) 19 MINN. L. Rnv. 752; Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source
of Liability (1919) 5 IOWA L. REv. 7, 86; Smith, Surviving Fictions (1917)
27 YALE L. J. 147-166, 317-330; Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresen-
tation (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 415, 420-440; Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations
in the Law of Torts (1905) 53 U. OF PA. L. REv. 209-239; Loring, Liability
of a Manufacturer or a Vendor (1904) 58 CENT. L. J. 365.
's Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 172, 11 N. E. (2d) 718 (1937).
See the comment on this case in 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306, at 316, by Prof.
Laurence H. Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability.
19 As significant evidence of this development see The Insurance Response
to a Shifting Caveat by Mary Coate Houtz in the Report of Proceedings of
the American Bar Ass'n, Section of Insurance Law, Sept., 1944, pp. 296-308.
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barn and silo, succeeded in holding liable for the amount of
the loss the manufacturer of a paint solution which was be-
ing used to cover the inner walls of the silo, when the fumes
from the paint came into contact with the open flame of an
ordinary lantern and a fire resulted which caused the loss
which the insurance company paid.20
Similarly, although the loss in this case resulted from an
eye injury to an individual, the insurer, in Commissioners v.
City Chemical Co., 21 obtained a decision in support of its
claim against the manufacturer of a chemical, which, appar-
ently, was mislabeled; the bottle containing the fluid, which
could not be identified because it was consumed in the flash,
exploded when tapped by a worker.
Perhaps the most unusual application of this expanding
theory was that which held a railroad company liable for hav-
ing blocked a road-crossing over railroad tracks, on which
a farmer was driving a pair of horses pulling an iron roller,
which, being forced off from the roadway, came into contact
with the rails, causing such a clanking, as the roller scraped
against the rails, that it startled the horses and caused them
to run away, throwing off the driver and inflicting severe
damage to him. In other words, the action of the railroad
company in permitting its freight-train to partially block
the crossing made the road-crossing a "dangerous instru-
mentality" ! 22
A survey of the hundreds of cases in the highest courts
and intermediate appellate courts throughout the country
reveals scores of unique applications of this newly developed
doctrine. Possibly the most striking of all was the decision
by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit
in a case in which a bottle filled with water was held to be
a dangerous instrumentality, when it was-no doubt inno-
cently enough-mislabeled "kerosene". The contents of the
bottle were used-as the court found had been the intention
of the donor thereof-in the conduct of some chemical experi-
ments. The water in the bottle was poured upon a substance
20 Genessee, etc. Ass'n v. Sonneborn, 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551 (1934).
21 Commissioners of Ins. v. City Chemical Co., 290 N. Y. 64, 48 N. E.
(2d) 262 (1943).22 Dandino v. N. Y. Central, 273 N. Y. 111, 6 N. E. (2d) 397 (1937).
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which, when mixed with kerosene, formed a harmless com-
bination but which exploded when water was applied to it.
Therefore, the water, harmless in itself, became a "dangerous
instrumentality" when used as kerosene, as might have been
foreseen.2
3
Out of all of this welter of authorities, what basic prin-
ciple can be derived to become the foundation of a ration-
alized theory to be applied to such situations as may here-
after develop? Must we be confronted by the artificial in-
tellectual creation of an implied obligation creating a con-
tractual right, the benefit of which can be claimed by one
suffering injury under a wide application of Lalirenee
against FoX? 24 Must we create an imaginary agreement on
the part of the manufacturer to pay to one injured by the
manufactured product who uses it as it had been intended
it should be used and suffers damage as a result, the con-
tractual right being transferred from person to person until
the injured party was the final recipient thereof? Or shall
we hark back to the condition in the early stages of tort law,
which many of us studied in the kindergarten grade at law
school, the old squib case? 2 5 The law laid down there held
that where one started in motion a dangerous instrumen-
tality which, when passed from hand to hand, finally reached
an innocent by-stander who was injured thereby, the one who
set the dangerous instrumentality in motion became liable to
anyone, no matter how far down the line, who was injured
as a result of the passing on of the dangerous instrumentality.
Isn't it time that the courts simplified their intellectual
processes in dealing with such situations and clearly stated
as the basis for holding the creator of the danger liable the
mere fact that he had launched into the world a dangerous
instrument which finally caused damage, whether to life,
limb, or property? 26
Take, for instance, the case at bar. A manufacturer of
23 Pease v. Sinclair Oil Co., 104 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
2 4 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
25 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black. W. Cases 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1770).
26 See Noone v. Perlberg, 268 App. Div. 149 (Opinion of Dore, J., p.
152). The Restatement of the Law of Torts (1931) devotes 117 pages and
21 sections to this one branch dealing with "Suppliers of Chattels," §§ 388-408,
pp. 1037-1055.
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evening gowns buys, presumably, thousands of yards of
glazed net-"sized" with some substance of which he is, pre-
sumably, entirely ignorant. It proves to have been, as a re-
sult of the sizing, an explosive substance which, when touched
by the lighted coal of a cigar or cigarette or the flame of a
match, would ignite in a blinding flash of flame. In order to
hold him liable, must we say that he knew or "should have
known" of the dangerous qualities of the substance? Should
we not rather come down to first principles and say the manu-
facturer launched upon the public, as did the man who threw
the squib, a dangerous instrumentality, which, whether he
realized it or not, when it followed a reasonably forseeable
course, resulted in cruel injuries to the innocent purchaser
or wearer of the gown or equally innocent by-standers? Must
we say that this is not a situation in which res ipsa loquitur
is applicable and then apply the basic principle of res ipsa
loquitur, concealed under a mass of verbiage-wrapped up
in presumptions, expressed in obligations of implied con-
tracts which no one ever conceived existed? May we not
hope that when opportunity is afforded, our courts will firmly
grasp a machete or a pruning-knife and clear away the under-
growth or cut down the bramble-bushes and leave the view
clear and the explanation of the liability simple and straight-
forward?
Meanwhile, we shall have to do our best, in the applica-
tion and, when necessary, expansion of the doctrine that a
maker is liable when he launches upon an unsuspecting pub-
lic an iistrumentality which, when used in such a manner as
was either intended or might normally have been foreseen,
develops into something inherently dangerous to human life
and limb and, incidentally, in many cases to property, if the
manufacturer knew that the article was capable of becoming
under such circumstances "inherently dangerous"-or
"should have known", however ignorantly and bona fide he
may have acted.
JOHN ]KIRKLAND CLARK.
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